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Abstract
Does providing information about a product inﬂuence the impact of price
subsidies on purchases? This question is particularly relevant for health prod-
ucts in developing countries where both informational campaigns and price
subsidies are common policy instruments. We conduct a ﬁeld experiment in
Zambia and ﬁnd that providing information about a new version of a product
signiﬁcantly increases the impact of price subsidies on take-up. Taken alone,
the information manipulation has no signiﬁcant impact on demand while the
price subsidy substantially increases demand. However, the evaluation of ei-
ther intervention in isolation fails to capture the signiﬁcant complementarity
between the two.
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11 Introduction
Governments and NGOs commonly use both informational campaigns and price sub-
sidies in attempts to increase the use of health products and other socially beneﬁcial
technologies in developing countries (Hecht and Shah 2006, Nugent and Knaul 2006).
The optimal deployment of these policy instruments depends on the way they interact
in the policy maker’s production function; if providing households with information
about a product changes the demand function, it may also aﬀect the policy maker’s
optimal level of a price subsidy.
Information about a product can impact demand in two broad ways. First, pro-
viding information can aﬀect the overall level of demand. For instance, information
can increase demand by allowing consumers to purchase more appropriate products
(Tadelis and Zettelmeyer 2011). Or, if the quality of the product does not match
consumers’ ex ante expectations, providing information can change the average per-
ception of quality (Caswell and Mojduszka 1996). Second, and more important for
our purposes, providing information can change the elasticity of demand (and thus
the impact of price subsidies). For example, information can increase the dispersion
of consumers’ valuation, which rotates the demand curve clockwise, making demand
less sensitive to price (Johnson and Myatt 2006). But, if consumers’ initial beliefs
are more heterogeneous than their valuations, information will have the exact oppo-
site eﬀect. Moreover, information can reduce the extent of consumers’ price-based
inference, thus making demand more sensitive to price (Judd and Riordan 1994).1
Hence, the impact of information on the level and the slope of the demand curve is
fundamentally an empirical question.
In this paper, we estimate the causal impact of information about an unfamiliar
health product on the eﬀectiveness of price subsidies. Using door-to-door marketing
in Lusaka, Zambia, we oﬀered a new, unfamiliar water puriﬁcation product for sale to
487 households, randomly varying both the price subsidy and the information about
the product. We oﬀered this unfamiliar target product alongside a familiar substitute
1Wedig and Tai-Seale (2002) show that giving consumers a report card with detailed information
about the quality and coverage of health insurance plans increases the elasticity of demand with
respect to price.
2product (Clorin), which we sold at its regular market price of 800 Zambian Kwacha
(around 0.20 USD).2 We varied the price of the target product from zero (full subsidy)
to 1200 Kwacha (no subsidy).3 This variation allows us to estimate the quantity
demanded across the full range of relevant subsidy levels. We varied the information
through a simple manipulation that involved telling some subjects that the target
product is “an alternative water puriﬁcation solution that is not available for purchase
in Zambia but that we are oﬀering this month only for sale to randomly selected
households in your area.” Other subjects were told on addition that “the solution
contains the same ingredients as regular Clorin but the strength or concentration of
the ingredient is higher” and were given the opportunity to inspect the product.4 We
refer to these two groups of households as uninformed and informed, respectively.5
Our main speciﬁcation compares the impact of the price subsidy on purchase be-
havior across uninformed and informed households. Overall, 34 percent of households
purchase the target product. The probability that an uninformed household pur-
chases the product increases by 3.4 percentage points for every 100 Kwacha increase
in the price subsidy. Among the informed households, this eﬀect is 5.4 percentage
points. In other words, information and subsidies are complements: providing con-
sumers with additional information about the product increases the eﬀectiveness of
price subsidies by about 60 percent. Our result is driven by consumers’ shift from
the familiar product toward the target one, not by an overall increase in the demand
for water puriﬁcation.
While our data do not pin down a speciﬁc mechanism behind the observed comple-
mentarity, one straightforward way to interpret our results is through price signaling.
In the absence of information, people tend to take a price of the unfamiliar product
2In 2004, the average monthly income for a household in a low income urban neighborhood in
Zambia was 645,000 Kwacha (Central Statistics Oﬃce 2005).
3The unfamiliar product is not available for sale in Zambia, but based on estimated costs of
production and distribution, its market price under perfect competition would be around 1200
Kwacha.
4The English language script is in the Appendix. Scripts were administered in Nyanja.
5Our information manipulation relies on the presence of the familiar substitute product to convey
quality information. In this way, it is most similar to information campaigns that oﬀer explicit
product comparisons or demonstrates the mechanisms through which a product works. In our
sample, over 90 percent of respondents report having used Clorin in the past.
3as a signal of its quality, so high prices do not diminish the quantity demanded very
much. When information is provided, the signaling content of the price diminishes.
As a result, demand becomes more elastic.6 In particular, informed consumers see
no reason to pay more for the new product given that it has the same ingredients as
the familiar one. The eﬀect of the information is thus to encourage more people to
switch from the substitute product to the target one at low prices, and vice versa at
high prices.
As in many other ﬁeld experiments, our ability to generalize beyond the speciﬁc
product, context, and intervention is limited. In particular, one could certainly
imagine circumstances where price signaling is unlikely to be important. Despite the
limited generalizability, however, our paper makes two substantive contributions.
First, we ﬁnd that the complementarity between two commonly used policy in-
struments, subsidies and information, can be quite large; in our setting, the impact of
price subsidies is 60 percent greater among the informed households. The magnitude
of this point estimate highlights the potential importance of taking complementar-
ities into account when designing policy interventions. Second, previous work on
pricing of health products in developing countries (Dupas 2009, Ashraf et al. 2010,
Cohen and Dupas 2010) has focused almost exclusively on products that are familiar.
Our study reveals that optimal pricing may be diﬀerent for products that are new
or unfamiliar.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section relates our result to the existing
literature. The following describes the design and the implementation of the ﬁeld
experiment. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Existing literature
Our paper primarily relates to two strands of existing literature. Numerous studies
have estimated the impact of information programs (Jalan and Somanathan 2008,
Luoto et al. 2012) and price subsidies (Kremer and Miguel 2007, Ashraf et al. 2010,
6Judd and Riordan (1994) present a model that formalizes this idea.
4Cohen and Dupas 2010) in isolation. Our paper is more closely related to the small
literature that examines interactions between the two policies.7 Dupas (2009) com-
pares purchase decisions at various levels of subsidies for insecticide treated mosquito
nets, with information treatments that alternatively stress the health or ﬁnancial
beneﬁts of malaria prevention.8 She ﬁnds that neither information treatment aﬀects
the demand function. Dupas (2012) considers a setting with endogenous information
acquisition and ﬁnds that short-run subsidies for insecticide treated nets can increase
long-run demand. Duﬂo et al. (2012) examine the interaction between HIV informa-
tion and education subsidies (free school uniforms) on early pregnancy and sexually
transmitted infections (STIs) among teenage girls in Kenya. They ﬁnd that educa-
tion subsidies have a stronger eﬀect on STIs when accompanied by information, but
a weaker eﬀect on early fertility when information is provided than when it is not.
Finally, Meredith et al. (2012) vary the provision of health information at diﬀerent
subsidy levels for a variety health products in four countries. In only one of their
seven experiments do subsidies have a diﬀerential eﬀect on demand when coupled
with information. In contrast to our experiment, none of aforementioned studies
analyze the potential complementarity between subsidies and information about the
speciﬁc product that is being subsidized.
Our paper is also related to a literature outside of development on the interaction
between prices and advertising by proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms. Early work by Prasad and
Ring (1976) documents greater price sensitivity among consumers exposed to greater
amounts of advertising.9 More recent work by Kaul and Wittink (1995) surveys
7Some work also examines potential complementarities between other interventions. Cole et al.
(2011) ﬁnd no complementarity between ﬁnancial literacy training and subsidies in their impact on
the demand for credit. Gine and Mansuri (2011) show that business training is no more eﬀective
when coupled with access to credit. Groh et al. (2012) ﬁnd that employability skills training does
not increase the impact of a wage subsidy program. Doi et al. (2012) document that ﬁnancial
literacy training has a much greater impact on saving when provided both to the migrant worker
and to their family in the home country.
8Berry et al. (2012) examine an interaction between price subsidies and provision of information
about the market price of the product. They ﬁnd that the impact of subsidies is not aﬀected by
the provision of this information.
9Our experiment is also connected to the marketing literature on the preference for well-known
brands (for example, Hoyer and Brown 1990 show that consumers use brand as a choice heuristic).
5marketing research on the eﬀect of advertising on price sensitivity and concludes that
non-price advertising tends to decrease price sensitivity, though evidence is mixed.
Our suggested channel of price signaling has been extensively explored in economic
theory (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts 1986), though empirical evidence on the topic is
scant (Heﬀetz and Shayo 2009).
3 Experimental design
Our experimental design is straightforward. We varied both how much information
we provide to consumers and how much we subsidize the product we are asking them
to buy. These two orthogonal sources of variation allow us to assess the complemen-
tarity between information and subsidies.
To increase the chance that our informational intervention has an impact, we used
an unfamiliar good as our target product. Speciﬁcally, we imported two varieties of
water puriﬁcation products: AquaGuard and WaterGuard from Uganda and Kenya
respectively. Initially, these were intended to represent branded (Uganda) versus
unbranded (Kenya) products to assess the potential interaction of treatment eﬀects
with branding. However, the two imported products were identical in the size and
shape of their bottles and focus groups gave mixed responses as to which looked
more “branded”. Accordingly, the two unfamiliar products, which were balanced
across treatments, are pooled throughout the analysis.10 For the remainder of the
paper we refer to both AquaGuard and WaterGuard as the target product.
Our experiment was implemented in collaboration with Society for Family Health
(SFH). SFH is a social marketing ﬁrm that sells Clorin, the commonly used water
puriﬁcation system, in Zambia. SFH is a non-proﬁt organization that distributes
Clorin through door-to-door marketing and aims to set prices to maximize take-up
and use rather than proﬁts.11
10Our results are unchanged if we include a control for the type of the unfamiliar product in
Equation (2).
11SFH is well known in the neighborhoods where we conducted the study. We also administered a
small survey to 41 respondents and asked about their perceptions of SFH. Respondents were asked
whether SFH was a good, bad or okay organization and whether its products were of high, low
6While the basic logic of our design could have been implemented by simply oﬀer-
ing the target product for sale, based on discussions with SFH we also oﬀered Clorin
for sale at its standard (subsidized) market price alongside the target product. One
beneﬁt of doing so was to make the households’ interaction with the marketers less
unusual by presenting, alongside the target product, a familiar product at a familiar
price. Like most subsidized health products in Lusaka, and elsewhere in the devel-
oping world, Clorin is sold at a posted price with no reference to its subsidization.
Consequently, to maximize external validity, we did not tell our subjects that the
target product we oﬀered them is subsidized. The details of our design are as follows.
A team of 6 marketers worked in 6 low-to-middle income compounds in Lusaka
over a period of approximately 4 weeks in August and September of 2007. Lack
of street addresses and detailed maps made ex ante random sampling infeasible, so
marketers were instructed to visit every ﬁfth house along a street. If no one was home
in the target house, they visited the house to the right, and if that also failed, then
the house to the left, before counting another 5 houses along the street. Marketers
traveled in groups of two to a diﬀerent compound each day.
The marketing scripts were designed to make the interaction similar to other
door-to-door marketing campaigns in Lusaka. Scripts were pre-printed to reﬂect the
26 conditions: informed vs. uninformed crossed with 13 diﬀerent subsidy levels from
K0 (price = K1200) to K1200 (price = zero) in K100 increments.12 Scripts were
provided to marketers in random order and they were instructed to use them in that
order. Checks of ordering according to position along selected streets conﬁrmed that
the randomization was followed. Either 18 and 19 observations were collected in each
condition for a total of 487 observations.13
In all treatments, a single female marketer approached the house, introduced
or okay quality. Seventy-nine percent indicated that SFH was a good organization and 43 percent
thought its products were of high quality.
12The price was not framed as a subsidy to the consumer, in keeping with the NGO’s typical
approach.
13One treatment combination (informed, subsidy of K900) contains only 17 observations due to
a failure of a single marketer to meet her target on the ﬁnal day of data collection. Marketers were
paid by the day, and were given performance targets associated with number of households visited.
Pay was not tied to sales of either the target product or Clorin.
7herself as being a representative of SFH and asked to speak with the female head
of household. If the female head was not present, the visit was terminated, and the
marketer continued to the next house in the sampling scheme. If the female head was
available, the marketer explained that she was selling water puriﬁcation solutions.
All subjects were told that two types of puriﬁcation solutions were available
and only a single bottle could be purchased of either Clorin at the standard price of
K800, or the target product at K[randomly determined price]. The two products were
displayed in a transparent plastic case. All subjects were told that the target product
is sold in other countries but is not available for purchase in Zambia except for
randomly selected households in the area for a short time. In the informed treatment,
the marketer opened the display case and removed both bottles for the respondent
to inspect. In addition, the informed subjects were given detailed information about
the similarity between the target product and Clorin, including the fact that the
two products have the same active ingredient and same treatment instructions. The
target product had a slightly higher concentration so the bottle was slightly smaller
to oﬀer the same treatment capabilities.
After hearing the information about the products, subjects were asked whether
they would like to purchase either a bottle of Clorin or a bottle of the target product.
The marketers made it clear that the household could purchase at most one bottle of
at most one product. After subjects completed their purchase decisions, marketers
asked a brief set of survey questions. In addition, the marketers recorded any free-
form comments and were trained on a set of pre-scripted responses to frequently
asked questions.
Some aspects of our experimental design might appear contrived. However, door-
to-door marketing is very common in Lusaka, particularly in the low-to-middle in-
come compounds where the study was implemented. Among health products, perfect
or near complements are often found on the market in Zambia, such as generic and
branded condoms, or water puriﬁcation tablets and solution. Both consumer in-
formation and subsidy levels diﬀer across the alternatives. Moreover, products are
often brought to Zambia from other countries for short-term oﬀ-loads of production
surpluses. An informal survey identiﬁed many products that were available only for
8short periods of time in Lusaka in the past, including cooking pots from South Africa,
cosmetics from the United Kingdom and candy from the United States. Accordingly,
we think it plausible that most of the households in our sample did not suspect that
they were a part of an experiment, except perhaps those who were oﬀered the target
product for free.14 Excluding those subjects from our analyses only strengthens our
ﬁndings.
4 Results
4.1 Separate impact of information and subsidies
While our main focus will be on the interaction between information provision and
price subsidies, we begin our analysis by examining the independent impact of each of
these interventions. Table 1 fully describes all the choice data from our experiment.
The Table reports the number of households that purchase Clorin and the number of
households that purchase the target product in each of the 26 conditions. Figure 1
plots the share of subjects purchasing the target product in each subsidy-information
treatment cell. Throughout the paper we will focus on purchase of the target product
as the outcome variable.
As we discussed earlier, providing information can either increase or decrease
demand. Information allows consumers to select more appropriate products and to
use them more appropriately; this force can lead information to increase demand. On
the other hand, consumers’ initial beliefs about quality might be optimistic, which
could lead information to decrease demand. Pooling over all subsidy levels, 32%
of the uninformed households purchase the target product; providing information
increases that fraction to 37%. This diﬀerence, however, is not statistically signiﬁcant
(p =0 .252).
Pooling across the two information conditions, we examine the impact of subsidies
14Oral consent was obtained before we administered the survey after the purchase decision. The
project was exempted from review by the Harvard Business School Institutional Review Board
because we did not collect identiﬁers and implemented the project within the ongoing activities of
SFH.
9on purchases by considering a linear probability model:
Purchasei = α + βS × Subsidyi + εi (1)
where i indexes households, Purchasei is an indicator variable for whether the head
of household purchased the target product, and Subsidyi ∈{ 0,1,...,12} is the extent
of the price subsidy, in units of K100. Column (2) of Table 2 reports the regression
estimates with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. Each additional K100 sub-
sidy increases probability of purchase by 4.4 percentage points
￿
ˆ βS =0 .044
￿
. This
eﬀect of subsidy on purchases is highly signiﬁcant (p<0.01).
4.2 Complementarity of information and subsidies
In this subsection we turn to our main question: are information and price subsidies
complements or substitutes? As before, we utilize a linear probability model, but
using a logit or a probit instead yields similar results. Our main regression is:
Purchasei = α + βS × Subsidyi + βI × Informationi (2)
+ βC × Subsidyi × Informationi + εi
where Informationi is an indicator variable for whether the household was informed
and other variables are deﬁned as earlier. Column (3) of Table 2 reports the esti-
mates. For households given no subsidy, the informational intervention is estimated
to decrease purchases by 7 percentage points
￿
ˆ βI = −0.070
￿
, though this eﬀect is
not signiﬁcant.15 Among the uninformed households, the probability of purchase in-
creases by 3.4 percentage points for each additional K100 in subsidies
￿
ˆ βS =0 .034
￿
.
In contrast, among the informed households, each additional K100 in subsidies in-
15Recall that information we provided to informed households suggested that the target product
was very similar to Clorin. Hence, it is not surprising that for households who were oﬀered no
subsidies on the target product, i.e., for whom the target product was 50% more expensive than
Clorin, providing this information made Clorin seem more attractive than the target product.
10creases purchases by 5.4 percentage points
￿
ˆ βS + ˆ βC =0 .054
￿
. In other words, pro-
viding consumers with information increases the eﬀectiveness of price subsidies by
60%. This eﬀect is marginally signiﬁcant, just shy of the conventional 5% level
(p =0 .055). These results are robust to the inclusion of compound and marketer
ﬁxed eﬀects.16
We also examine to what extent information and subsidies aﬀect the purchases of
the target product through substitution from Clorin. Column (4) of Table 2 reports
the results of a regression where the dependent variable is whether the household pur-
chased either the target product or Clorin. The coeﬃcient on Subsidyi×Informationi
is close to zero,17 which suggests that information makes price subsidies more eﬀec-
tive in inducing households to substitute Clorin for the target product, rather than
in inducing households to purchase a water puriﬁcation system. This may be due
to the fact that the information we provided was primarily about the merits of the
target product relative to Clorin rather than about water puriﬁcation systems or the
health risks of untreated water in general.18
5 Discussion
We present simple evidence on the interaction between two interventions designed
to increase demand for an unfamiliar health product. We ﬁnd that the marginal
impact of a price subsidy is greater if consumers are also given information about
the product. This result indicates that precise product information and subsidies
can be complements in the NGO’s production function and that program evaluation
and intervention design can be improved by considering interactions across demand
generation strategies.
16Compound ﬁxed eﬀects tighten the standard errors without changing the magnitude of ˆ βC,
increasing the signiﬁcance slightly to p =0 .049. Marketer ﬁxed eﬀects increase standard errors
slightly (p =0 .082), again without changing the magnitude of ˆ βC. Finally, including both compound
and marketer ﬁxed eﬀects results in p =0 .072.
17We can reject the hypothesis that this coeﬃcient is the same as in column (3).
18Ideally, we would also wish to know whether purchases of the target product had any long-term
impact on the use of water puriﬁcation products, but obtaining such data was not feasible.
11While our design is simple, it controls for many of the complexities associated
with the introduction of new health products in developing countries, such as re-
peated purchases (Dupas 2010), learning from own experience and the experience
of others (Oster and Thornton 2012), and expectations of future prices (Berry et
al. 2012). Some of our design features, however, come at a cost. For instance,
we intentionally give subjects a one-shot decision to avoid inter-temporal substitu-
tion and endogenous information acquisition. Yet, the decision to take up a new
health product is typically a dynamic one, and our design ignores the nuances of
repeated purchase opportunities and information dissemination. In this sense, our
ﬁndings complement Dupas’ (2012) two-stage design in which random variation in
prices in the ﬁrst period is followed by endogenous learning and a second purchase
opportunity. Her results show a positive relationship between price subsidies and
endogenous information dissemination, while we show a positive interaction between
price subsidies and exogenously provided information. By constraining the purchase
decision to a one-time purchase of at most one unit of the product, our results are
most informative about the factors that drive consumers to try new or unfamiliar
products.
While we remain agnostic about the speciﬁc mechanism that drives our results,
our ﬁndings are consistent with consumers making inferences about product quality
from product price. In many models of this phenomenon (e.g., Judd and Riordan
1994), consumers’ inference makes demand less sensitive to price since lower prices
signal lower quality. Hence, providing consumers with product information reduces
the role of inference, thus makes the demand function steeper, and in turn makes
price subsidies more eﬀective.
Our ancillary data provide some support for this interpretation of the results. In
the survey conducted after the purchase decision we ﬁnd that the perceived quality of
the target product relative to Clorin is negatively related to the subsidy level. More-
over, informed subjects’ perception of quality is less aﬀected by the subsidies, though
this interaction eﬀect is both economically small and statistically insigniﬁcant. Fi-
nally, the free-form comments from the subjects also support a role of inference.
These comments include statements that “free one can’t be good,” “it’s better that’s
12why it’s expensive,” and “how you tell if something is better is by the price.”
Whatever the mechanism behind our results may be, the complementarity be-
tween information and subsidies implies they will more eﬀective when applied in
unison. Identifying the contexts in which subsidies and information act as comple-
ments will help build on these initial results, as will further experimentation to isolate
the channels through which subsidies and production information interact.
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19Table 2: Impact of subsidy on purchase probabilities
Dependent variable Purchase either 
product
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Subsidy 0.044 0.034 0.044
(0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
Information 0.049 -0.070 0.044
(0.043) (0.068) (0.079)
Subsidy * Information 0.020 -0.002
(0.011) (0.011)
Constant 0.318 0.078 0.113 0.182
(0.030) (0.038) (0.054) (0.055)
R-squared 0.001 0.120 0.126 0.099
N 487 487 487 487
Mean of Dependant Variable 0.343 0.343 0.343 0.460
Purchase target product
Notes: All outcomes are binary and estimates are from linear probability models. Heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors in parentheses. Subsidies are in K100. Columns 1-3 use a binary dependent variable equal to
one if the subject purchases the target product. Column 4 uses a binary dependent variable equal to one if
the subject purchases either product (target product or Clorin).
20Figure 1: Eﬀect of subsidy on purchases of the target product
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21Appendix: Marketing script
Marketer: _______________        House plot no: _______________ 
Date:______________          Compound:_______________ 
Alt Product: WG __ AG __        Nearby landmark: _____________ 
 
STEP 1 Hello and how are you?  My name is ______________________________ and I am 
representing the Society for Family Health.  
                         
STEP 2 ‘Is the female head of the household here?’    
 ________ Yes it’s me/ Yes let me go get her.  (!Go to STEP 3 )  
 ________ No she is not here. (!Go to STEP 9) 
               
STEP 3   We are going today to randomly selected households in your area, in order to make water 
purification solutions available for sale from SFH.  
 
As you may know, Clorin is a water purification treatment, usually sold in retailers at around 800 Kw 
per bottle.  Today we would like to offer to sell you a single bottle of water purification solution.  We 
have two types of water purification solution available.   
 
INFO TREATMENT ONLY: I would like to tell you a few things about the alternative water 
purification solution.  The solution contains the same ingredients as regular Clorin but the strength 
or concentration of the ingredient is higher.  As you can see, the bottle is smaller than the regular 
Clorin bottle.  The way that the alternative product kills germs is the same as regular Clorin, and it 
will have the same effect on the taste of the water.   
 
[REMOVE BOTTLES FROM DISPLAY AND SHOW CUSTOMER INFORMATION ON BOTH 
BOTTLES: concentration, volume, use instructions]  
 
The lid measurements are designed for the same size water containers as the regular Clorin bottle 
(20 liters), but since it is stronger, you should follow the measurement instructions on the bottle.  The 
way you treat water with the alternative water purification solution is the same as regular Clorin.  
Mix, shake and wait for 30 minutes.  
 
The first for sale is the regular Clorin you are accustomed to seeing in stores.  We can offer that to 
you for 800 Kw.  The second is an alternative water purification solution that is not available for 
purchase in Zambia but that we are offering this month only for sale to randomly selected households 
in your area.  The product will not be available after this short term sale period.  It is available for sale 
in other countries all the time.  We can offer that to you for PRICE Kw. 
 
STEP 4   Would you be interested in purchasing one of these two bottles of water purification 
solution today?  
 
________ Yes  (!Go to STEP 5 )      ________   No  (! Go to STEP 7) 
   
Reason for no purchase, if volunteered (do not prompt): _________________  
 
STEP 5  Would you like to buy the Clorin for K800 or the alternative water purification solution for 
KPRICE?  
___________ Clorin          ___________Alternative  
 
STEP 6     Wonderful.  If you wouldn’t mind, could you sign this receipt for my supervisor?   
[Complete receipt and have recipient sign.] 
                    ! Go to Questions 
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